English translation of the French transcript, made with AI and not yet proofread — click a paragraph to jump to it. Show the French original
Commenting on a text by Clouscard 0:30 I'm quite pleased to address all those who follow us faithfully, all those, men and women, who follow us faithfully. I'm pleased to address them on holiday — maybe they're at my place in Corsica on a beach, I don't know, where I wish them, while they wash off the sea water in a mountain stream 20 minutes by car from the coast. You can do that in Corsica. All right, I'm not here to run the tourist office.
1:07 And I thank Philippe for giving me the chance to stay in touch, even during this long parenthesis of the summer holidays, with our audience — whether those who come regularly to the workshops, or, and they are quite numerous and increasingly so, those who follow us remotely and who only know us through the networks, as they say.
1:39 And it's for all of them that I chose to "debunker" — that's a new word for me, hard to pronounce, coming out of a bunker, I don't know where it comes from, that must be roughly it — to bounce off, to comment on. A more traditional word, not a video this time, but a text. And a text by Clouscard, by Michel Clouscard — that's quite a difference, it's actually the first time I've taken as an object of reflection a text by one who was a friend and remains an unreplaced friend, and whom I maintain — this isn't given lightly, it may sound a bit grandiose and even derisory — is nonetheless by far the greatest Marxist thinker of the postwar period, incomparably so.
2:37 I noticed with a certain satisfaction recently that I'm no longer quite the only one to say so — someone I don't know, so we didn't coordinate, well, I don't know him closely, I know him by name, like many in the orbit of the Communist Party at the time, I'm thinking of Gilles Questiot, who doesn't hesitate to say — you can find it online, by the way, a very fine article he devoted to him on the occasion of the reissue of L'Être et le Code by Éditions Delga — where he says it is doubtless and by far the greatest Marxist thinker of the postwar period. That made me jump; I said to myself, if someone who played such a major role in the upper echelons of the French Communist Party, so to speak, says that, well then, something is happening in the reception of Michel Clouscard's work.
Morilhat, class unconscious and Althusser's note 3:35 Here I've chosen precisely a reply he wrote, in the journal Société française, to Claude Morilhat. Morilhat is somewhat Clouscard's honest man, in several works in particular, in Le Frivole et le Sérieux — that is, a reader who has at least intellectual honesty, I'm not talking about ideological honesty, am I even capable of ideological honesty myself — we all have a class unconscious.
4:17 I often have occasion to come back to this, and there will be other occasions to dig into this fundamental notion, which rather makes a mockery of the note Althusser makes, almost on the very first page of Reading Capital, when he says — quite rightly, up to that point I had nothing to object to — that the great articulations in the history of philosophy always correspond to a belated reprise of an upheaval that had just occurred outside philosophy, in the world of the sciences.
5:04 And that, for example, to take the first system in writing that has come down to us in this discipline, following Plato — it's no accident that Plato reacts to the appearance of mathematics around the work of Pythagoras, of Thales, and later, after Plato, of Euclid. I sum all that up through the metonymy of Euclid, even though Euclid actually comes after Plato — it's mainly Pythagoras when Plato is speaking, Philolaus, well, we're not here to go into detail — but if Plato put at the entrance to his school "let no one enter here who is not a geometer," it's to say, firstly, we're not here to do mathematics and geometry, leave that at the door, but you don't get in if you haven't been trained for philosophy by that excellent exercise which the mathematical disciplines are, essentially geometry, and a bit of arithmetic, which will see great development later with Euclid.
6:13 So there it is, it's not entirely by chance — up to that point Althusser is perfectly right. Descartes is a reaction to the appearance of Galilean physics, that works very well, what Althusser says, he's quite right, especially since he took the idea from Bachelard, of course. And so he lays out, in a very correct and rigorous way, the chronology of the thing: the appearance of mathematics, first system of philosophy, Plato; the appearance of physics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Galileo, that gives us the birth of the philosophy known as of the subject, or modern philosophy, with Descartes — I'll add Newton, of course, one could say that a large part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, so this fundamental articulation of modern, almost contemporary thought — we'll come back to this with the importance of neo-Kantianism in Clouscard's thought within contemporary thinking — what would Kant's thought have been if it hadn't been almost entirely polarized.
7:26 well, in his theoretical philosophy at least, in any case in the Critique of Pure Reason, by Newtonian physics. And of course, he says, Marx — that will be the science of history, the historical disciplines, science of history, a generic term that should encompass all the human sciences — I challenge sociology, psychology, demography, I'm talking about the human sciences, anthropology, whatever you like — I challenge those disciplines to have any meaning outside of history, they are all within history, so history is indeed a generic discipline, and, well, an endless debate about whether one should speak of the human sciences, quote-unquote, or the social sciences, quote-unquote — for now the quotation marks are fighting over the adjective, but I think the quotation marks should mainly go around the word 'science' — I'm not sure these are sciences at all, but let's say they're disciplines, that's already something, like philosophy, which isn't a science but is nonetheless a demand for rigor.
8:36 which is a discipline. Well, these sciences, I mean, only arise within an element — to use a Hegelian term — the way fish are in the aquatic element; they imply, they presuppose, the element of history in order to exist. So, I mean, instead of saying social science, human science, one should say the historical disciplines. All right, I won't dwell further on this long parenthesis meant to contextualize what I want to quote from Althusser regarding the class unconscious — I had gotten to that point.
9:14 because at the end, in a note, at the end of this development on the relationship of philosophy, which reacts belatedly and after the fact to prior scientific advances, he says one should perhaps also look at the unconscious continent opened up by Freud. Now there, my ear pricks up a bit, because I mean, Marx didn't wait for Freud — I'm one of those who says we've never finished measuring the depth and scope of the Freudian discovery, in a generic sense, of the many discoveries it implies, so this isn't at all reductive, what I mean, but simply, it isn't the notion of the unconscious that inaugurates it.
10:06 When Marx says in the preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy — it's the very first sentence of that text — in the social production of their existence, men enter into necessary relations, determined, independent of their will — involuntary, unconscious, call it what you like — that says quite clearly what it means: that all this happens precisely nowhere one might choose, except in consciousness.
10:38 We'll come back to this shortly, regarding what Clouscard calls the phenomenology of the bourgeoisie. So it struck me as fascinating to see him address this, to see him respond to someone who can embody that honest man he calls for, that he might read him.
Clouscard's isolation and class contempt 11:10 So, to pick up my thread — even with his ideological unconscious, which we all have, myself first — but who at least has an honesty, if not ideological, at least intellectual. And in any case, who read him closely. And there you have it. So Claude Morilhat had written a review of the three works that followed L'Être et le Code — Néo-fascisme et idéologie du désir, and which had just come out at that time, Le Capitalisme de la séduction, La Bête sauvage, L'Égal, La Pratique libérale.
11:46 And it had just come out, and he does a review of it, as they say, a detailed account. And for Clouscard, who until the end of his life, and increasingly toward the end of his life, suffered far more than he could express, more than is generally realized, from this solitude — not a psychological one. He was surrounded, he had friends, that is, myself, when I was...
12:20 There were many years when I only had him on the phone, in Africa. We talked on the phone a lot while he was writing his books. We had very, very, very fruitful exchanges. But there was also, of course, François de Negroni, Christian Riochet, one of the oldest friends, who supported him so much in spreading works like L'Être et le Code, and in helping the public find their way through the dense thicket of Clouscardian prose.
13:00 Of course, the irreplaceable René Comer, who was, for him, the Auvergnat. It's the first time I've made this comparison, but it seems obvious to me. In the literal sense, the one who gives you something to eat, even if it was just a little bread. René Comer was a restaurateur, so first in the literal sense — and God knows how important that was. For Clouscard, who had known the Occupation, the deprivations.
13:34 And I remember his fits of anger toward me when I played the heron, in La Fontaine's sense. During his outings, he loved having me take him around, whether through the French countryside or here. It would be picnic time. We had planned to picnic. I would be picky, playing the heron: here, yes, it's nice, there's the stream, but no shade; here, there's shade, but no stream.
14:04 At one o'clock, he'd explode. It's lunchtime, we eat on the gravel, on the roadside, I don't care, but we eat. There you go. So when I say in both the literal and figurative sense, he was a restorer of bodies and souls, René Comer. So he was very much surrounded. It's not that kind of solitude I'm talking about, I'm not into flattery, but a solitude from the lack of recognition from those from whom he expected it most. That is, of course, the academic world — but there, one can say he had it, at least in part.
14:36 He did have it after all, and that's why he used to say — I'm interrupting my sentence, but not at all my point — he especially said toward the end of his life: on my tombstone, I'd like it to say 'Here lies Michel Clouscard, university professor.' Because for him, that meant that he never would have believed that the 'little thing,' as he himself called it, borrowing Daudet's title, that the little thing would one day become a university professor — this son of a father lost to the working class of Carmaux and a schoolteacher mother in Gaillac — he never would have believed he'd teach courses in Poitiers and be one of the crown jewels of the Hegelian-Marxist research institute in Poitiers, alongside first-rate stars like Jacques D'Hondt, for example, with whom he was very close.
15:32 So he had that recognition from the moment he defended his thesis with the jury's commendation. You have to see the praise from someone as unlikely to flatter as Jankélévitch. And Jankélévitch, we're quite far from Marx there. He's not an adversary, not a visceral anti-communist, far from it, but still, I mean, he's someone entirely independent of the Marxist milieu, which he knew well, and whom one wouldn't expect to see cited in the aesthetic domain, particularly the musical one, even though his specialty was moral philosophy, in the sense of the grand siècle, in the sense of the French moralists.
16:17 But, now, he praised him, saying that L'Être et le Code was a masterpiece, and he insists on the qualities of style. Now, what Clouscard is most often reproached for is having a style — class contempt calls it a laborious style, of course. I remember that, precisely in the company of his partner in sporting matters, I'm thinking again of René Comer, who had been a world military champion in the 100 meters and 200 meters butterfly.
16:55 So he got along very well with Clouscard on that level, and with Negroni, who was a ranked tennis player. I remember Clouscard pointing out to us the vocabulary, the lexicon, the semantics of an article in the sports section of Le Monde, for example, about a football match between France and, at the time, the German Democratic Republic, so-called East Germany.
17:27 And you'd immediately see passages like — of course, the East Germans had beaten us 4-0, but honor was saved because the article said the brilliant French panache had been defeated by the implacable East German machine. There you go. You immediately see the beautiful, the laborious, the machine, like a machine that functions without thinking. And the French, who have panache, just had no luck that day, but well, they were a bit distracted. That's the class contempt that makes people say Clouscard can't write.
18:00 He's not an aesthete. He's not proto-Mallarméan like Lacan. He doesn't have the flourishes and refinements of literary style, so important in France for making oneself heard. I don't say this contemptuously — it's a great tradition. But what is contemptible is class contempt, when one isn't within this 'code' — to use a term that takes on such fundamental significance in Clouscard, to the point that he often says the code, the proof, precedes being.
18:41 Being is seen through the filter of this code. And well, lo and behold, Jankélévitch, who is an emblematic example of that aestheticizing philosophy — not at all in a pejorative sense, he wrote some of the finest and most subtle texts on music, a bit sectarian at times, he holds a grudge, understandably given his origins and the period he lived through, against German music. Nonetheless, this same Vladimir Jankélévitch says that Clouscard is a champion of style.
19:20 Well, apart from these notable exceptions, Clouscard's solitude, I come back to it, was almost ontological in relation to what he expected — recognition. Again, sociologically he wasn't alone at all, but with regard to the academic world, where he did get that university recognition, full stop — but above all, where he suffered the most, is that he never got recognition from his political peers, that is, within the Marxist milieu itself, particularly within the French Communist Party, which was celebrating those who were busy throwing Marxist ideas out the window.
20:08 I remember very well, when we used to go to the Institut de recherche marxiste, we were much more into the semantics and problematics of Althusser — and let's add ideological state apparatus, symptomatic reading, I won't go into detail about all that since it's not the subject — but I mean the vocabulary, the syntax, and the style of the 'new criticism,' as it was called at the time, while Clouscard was superbly ignored. Hence — I won't dwell too long — the exception of Claude Morilhat, who wrote this honest review, saying, in a formula that sums up his stance and that Clouscard picks up on, saying he owns it — not just that he approves of it but that he owns it, that he recognizes himself well in that formula — namely, Clouscard, colon — I'm quoting Claude Morilhat again, in the journal Société française, an offshoot of the Institut de recherche marxiste — Michel Clouscard, colon, indispensable and insufficient.
"Indispensable and unsatisfactory"; Société française and Lefebvre 21:13 I'll read here the brief paragraph where Clouscard bounces off that formula. "I will even take up his introductory judgment," I quote Clouscard, "indispensable but... unsatisfactory." End of quote. "I might even say I'm proud of it. It's a perfect and, in my view, flattering dialectical positioning. My contribution to Marxist research, particularly in filling the theoretical gap, is acknowledged, since he says indispensable."
21:51 "And that, insofar as the critique of this contribution can allow for further progress in this research. I know full well that from what I say, people will find insufficiencies that will allow the critics to go even further. That's all I ask." So that's the text I've decided to dwell on and dig into a bit, because I don't know of any other that's as exhaustive on Clouscard's work in general.
22:23 So there it is, for those who might want to — after all, I'm talking about delving into this kind of problematic anyway — those trained first in the problematics of the human sciences, then in those of philosophy, and thirdly in the Marxist or Marxish milieu, whatever you want to call it, who have heard of Clouscard and would like to get a closer look at what it's all about. I'd recommend, among others, this piece.
22:55 There may be others, but in my view it's one of the most, again I say, exhaustive and one of the most in-depth at the same time. It's rare to have both in so few pages, as in this reply to Claude Morilhat. So, one last word before diving into the text itself, about the context of the publication. It appeared in Société française, and as I've already said, that's an offshoot of the Institut de recherche marxiste, which existed at the time on Boulevard Blanqui, the IRM.
23:33 But what's interesting is that the very expression, the syntagm 'Société française,' comes straight from the man who was Michel Clouscard's thesis supervisor, that is, Henri Lefebvre. It's well known, what I'm saying — I'm far from the first to say that Clouscard's work owes a great deal to the very particular and, at the time, original approach of Henri Lefebvre.
24:06 Boudot, who saw Clouscard as so opposed — but Henri Lefebvre, who always had affection for one of his protégés, he wasn't the only one, I'm thinking of Michel as a student, and who always had a mixture of affection and expectancy toward Michel Clouscard, who was somewhat what's called in French his 'duck's egg' — a strange offspring. He wondered how he could have hatched, to extend the egg metaphor, such an atypical discourse.
24:42 I remember very well, with his stentorian voice, how he'd say, 'Where do you get all that from, Michel?' He was even a bit stunned to see the immense divergence of his student compared to his own teaching. Now, it's precisely — an ugly word, but — the specialty and originality of Henri Lefebvre, that it was entirely contained in this expression 'société française' [French society].
25:19 not to make generalities about Marxism, about modes of production, productive forces — these concepts are fundamental, it's not at all a matter of marginalizing them, on the contrary, one can never dig into them enough — but to think them in concreto, through models that actually exist, and so I'm thinking of a monograph like La Vallée de Campan, a valley in the Pyrenees, a study Henri Lefebvre did on a Pyrenean valley studied across several generations, in sociology.
25:53 With all the approaches you like — empiricist, theoretical, formalist, whatever — but there it is, in concreto. And that's something that greatly marked Clouscard's work and corresponds to what he would later call — it's much discussed in this reply to Morilhat — the phenomenological approach. In a sense, we'll come back to this question of vocabulary, or rather, no.
26:25 I'll stop saying I'll come back to it later — often one says 'we'll come back to it' precisely so as not to come back to it; you realize afterward you never had time to. So, it's so important that I'm going to develop this point, because I'm not going to give a commentary on this text in the strict sense of the term, that is, as rigorously as it deserves. I've said it, almost the whole of Clouscard's work and its fundamentals parade through these few pages. So it wouldn't be serious of me to give an exhaustive commentary — that would take two or three years of seminars.
26:58 and collective work, inviting other Clouscardians to discuss it — let's not mix genres, no. But I'm going to pick out from this text themes that haven't been developed enough in Clouscardian exegesis, which seem to me the most important and among the most relevant today. And in any case, that's where I'll start — before diving into the text — the ones most in keeping with the transmission I'm trying to continue in what we've come to call our workshops.
27:40 Since I don't write, you see, in the workshops that are usually broadcast on YouTube or other platforms, I'm thinking especially of those who have hosted us with — I express all my gratitude — I'm thinking of Vimeo, and I thank here Michel Le Thomas, who has done an extraordinary job.
28:12 So, in keeping with these workshops, in which there is a theme that will now let me enter into the very text of this reply from Clouscard to Claude Morilhat. This theme is that of the positioning of philosophy in general. When we're talking about Marxist literature with Clouscard, how is it that we're still dealing with philosophy?
Why philosophy still, after Marx 28:46 Marx had not yet written his major work, his key writings, the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Capital, but he had already written a fundamental early work, The Poverty of Philosophy, polemicizing against Proudhon. And then there's another very famous quotation, isn't there: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." So that makes two instances where Marx sets himself apart from the discipline of philosophy.
29:22 Not in favor of the human sciences—that didn't exist. That's not the term, that syntagm. Nor of sociology; the word was only just beginning to emerge, the one that, as with Auguste Comte for example, was far from being popularized. Of course, Marx was thinking of history. I won't go back over it—I said earlier that history contains all the human sciences, which should be called the sciences of history, the historical sciences. That's how I distinguish between human sciences, social sciences, and historical sciences.
29:56 Now, we're not in philosophy there, we're no longer in it. So why do I insist on this philosophical positioning, to which Clouscard will return at the end of his life with an admirable work that Delga published, giving it this title, because the manuscript remained unfinished and without a definitive title—there were several proposed titles, revolving around praxis, I'm thinking of course of "The Path of Praxis," and "Being, the Subject, Praxis," etc.
30:38 He returns to what? To philosophical practice, where he says that this work is meant as a contribution to Hegelian philosophy. These are still crucial quotations—the last Clouscard, the final stage. So I'm not saying that Marx was wrong to say that philosophy had come to an end. On the contrary, it's because I think Marx is right that I resolve the apparent contradiction by saying that it is indeed a misfortune of the historical situation we are living in if we are still compelled to remain within the element of philosophy.
31:13 Now, when I try, in my teaching—and this is the result of countless exchanges I had day after day over many years with Michel—regarding the specificity, the positioning of philosophy relative to everything with which it might be confused, I most often place it not in a median position—I don't like that word, there's nothing worse than the abject extreme-center as a political positioning, that is, the political current that has governed us for so many generations, whether center-left or center-right, and which is anything but centrist, which is an extremism—all those who had collaborated during the war and who escaped the purge, and that's a lot of people since, according to historians like Annie Lacroix-Riz herself, there was no real purge to speak of, except with the small fry, I'm not even talking about those poor women whose heads were shaved,
32:23 the bastards who did that were people who were last-minute resisters, as they say, who had a lot to be forgiven for—no, no, I'm thinking of those who really kept people like Papon, for example, in the positions he held under Vichy and the positions he continued to hold, including even under De Gaulle's presidency, with the appalling anti-Arab pogroms that took place under his authority—I'm using the vocabulary of the time—and the drowning of dozens of North Africans in the Seine. So, as Annie Lacroix-Riz says, there wasn't much of a purge, but those who escaped the purge were careful, of course, to keep a low profile after the war—no more question of calling oneself far-right, or even right-wing, it was too marked, since even the non-communist left, the socialists, had voted as one, the SFIO, for Vichy,
33:33 for full powers to Pétain—let's be clear, the entire political France was implicated, apart from the Communist Party as an organization; there were, besides, individuals who did not go along with Pétain, and there were such people in every camp, including royalists who were in the Resistance—I'm not sectarian, far from it—but still, from the standpoint of organizations and parties, only the Communist Party refused to play that game. So the others kept a low profile, especially those most implicated. Now these people never appeared as right-wing, but under labels—I'm coming back to my extreme center, I haven't lost my thread—as various moderates, centrists, without labels. That circulated all the way to Giscard—Giscard's party, De Gaulle's powerful Minister of Finance—it's the Independent Republicans, they're pinned there, we're not in Gaullist right-wing territory, but that's where it comes from, when I say
The triangle: mathematics, poetry, philosophy 34:46 the political poverty of our era, and that the first symptoms are being felt at the very moment Clouscard is writing this text—I go back to this consideration, which will come as a surprise, a semantic one, which seems secondary—in Clouscard, style, form. Now, in this reply to Morilhat, he dwells a great deal on formulation. Let me take, well, one last point, because this is really the essential thing I'd like to develop today—I come back to how I position, I don't want to be too quick about this, philosophy in relation to everything with which it might be confused. So I've just made a long development to say: position, which is defined in relation to two other extremes—I haven't named them yet, so I'll say it now—scientific discourse,
35:56 mathematical essentially, and at the other extreme, poetic speech—let me try to be precise: discourse, which is not speech, mathematical, and poetic speech. And I've just made a long development to say: philosophy, which is not in the middle—not, we'll come back to this, the very ambiguous position of the middle, of the extreme-center, as I've just developed—but which faces off both these extremes back to back. So I'd prefer the figure of the triangle rather than that of the midpoint on a segment AB, the point M—no, like a triangle: there are two extremes, and then, you see, like an equilateral triangle, for example, there are two extremes at the bottom, at points B and C, and then there's a point A which is external to them and which sets them back to back against each other.
36:49 And as I often repeat, what characterizes precisely this very particular position of philosophy that makes it limp—the expression isn't mine, it's Merleau-Ponty's—it limps especially in its relation to politics, precisely because it claims for itself both the demand for rigor proper to scientific discourse, mathematical discourse in particular, but without doing what mathematical discourse rightly does, given its own particular aim—but philosophy doesn't do that—without thereby dispensing with everyday language, what linguists call natural language, which is an accumulation of completely unconscious poetics. I often say that we do exactly the opposite of Monsieur Jourdain—the same thing but in reverse: Monsieur Jourdain speaks prose without knowing it, he's amazed to learn he's a writer of prose, and here I'm saying that when we say the day is breaking,
38:00 we're making poetry without knowing it, we're not making prose, the opposite—we're making poetry without knowing it. It's a metaphor: the day doesn't break, it's not the sun that moves, it's us, it's the earth turning on itself. In short, this makes no sense at all from a strictly physical point of view—the day breaks—yet we understand each other perfectly well when we say the day is breaking. We're in metaphor, and almost all everyday language is like that. So why is this important? Because philosophy, I come back to it, on the one hand would like to borrow—hence Plato's expression, well known, let none enter here who is not a geometer—from geometry, from mathematics, its demand for rigor, in particular non-contradiction, the principle of identity, and, on the other hand, retain from natural language what mathematics does not retain, its metaphorical richness, its allusive richness.
First reproach: working with an axe 39:06 Now, look precisely at what Clouscard says in the first part of this reply. To respond—I recall that Clouscard decides very methodically to respond to three criticisms while also acknowledging—I'll read it, the first paragraph, it sets the tone for the whole reply: "Société française having proposed that I respond to Claude Morilhat's critique in its next issue, it is hastily and very quickly that I have drafted this first response, reserving the possibility of later offering a systematic response to the critique of the overall project."
39:41 "I would first like to thank Claude Morilhat for the very good spirit of his constructive critique"—so that's quite clear. But he decides to structure his response, since there are criticisms in the article Morilhat had written, and he takes up these three criticisms in ascending order of seriousness, from the least serious to the most serious. And so, speaking of the first one, he speaks of a somewhat loose vocabulary in Clouscard—Morilhat, that is. So you see, we're right in the middle of my semantic business.
40:11 I quote Morilhat: "The author often gives the impression of working with a hatchet." Clouscard replies: "That's what I would like to say a great deal about—too much, no doubt, I admit, given that the space to do so is very limited. Very often, indeed, I merely indicate, designate, mark; I merely stake a claim, point to the idea, the problem. What I wanted above all was to propose a work of global mapping, of situating, of delimitation."
40:42 We can clearly see there that he's signaling, of course, that we're not in algorithmic demonstration. We're not in Y equals F of X. We're not in algebraic calculation. And it's not a matter of being there. One must strive to be rigorous, but still with the rich metaphorical sedimentation that is constantly at work and that affects us most often without our realizing it, if not almost exclusively, in what's called natural language—clear language, so to speak.
41:21 And why do I insist on this natural language? Because people say: "In philosophy, all you have to do is do mathematics, drop that kind of language and create a truly rigorous language, well-coded, unambiguous." You'd no longer risk getting mixed up and arriving at contradictions. Why? Because, precisely, there is an axiological concern in philosophy. That's why this text is fundamental. Axiological—it's not just a matter of knowledge, as if it were only a matter of knowledge in the sense of the so-called hard sciences, that is, sciences—I take this literally as I speak—objective, not only in the quasi-moral sense of saying "I am objective, I strive not to take my subjective preferences into account," no, but objective in addition, that is, concerning only objects.
42:12 unlike philosophy, which answers to the Pythian imperative inscribed on the Temple of Apollo from the very beginning: know thyself. It is a logic of the subject; in principle, philosophy strives for a logic of the subject and not of the oxygen molecule, of the movements of plankton in the ocean, or of the magnitude of stars, which are the fundamental subjects there.
42:42 I'm not saying that at all ironically. I wouldn't be here, we wouldn't be here, if it weren't for those disciplines fortunately having been established with the rigor we know and the cognitive successes they've achieved, and I'm the last one who would want to sell them short. But here it's a matter of the science of what is external to what is properly human. That's where we get to. Isn't it? And there, it's a matter of knowing thyself, and that's why philosophy is necessarily, whether it wants to or not, dialectical.
Praxis: tool, instrument, architect and bee 43:19 Because as soon as we recall that anthropology, the emergence of an anthropology within natural being—which isn't even a being, by the way, it's a becoming, that's another debate, and I think we'll have a few opportunities to dig further into that aspect—but the way in which the human emerges, let's say, starting from... I'm within the consensus here... starting from the first flaked pebbles, the hand axes, even before polished stone, not to mention metals.
43:59 From the brief moment, in short, when there emerges this thing that will play such a central role in Clouscard's thinking, via Marx, praxis. Man appears where nature disappears, where the natural situation, as it was originally found, as the animal, for its part, is content with, disappears. When there is not merely a modification—a monkey can very well break a branch to reach something, or even birds—we say "bird-brain," even a sparrow's skull, you'd think there's not much of a brain in there, well think again, just look at crows, which are formidably intelligent; a passerine, a tiny bird of no consequence at all, can very well use its beak to cut off a thorn, hold it in its beak, and use it to pull a larva out of a hole in a branch, which is nonetheless an extremely complicated operation—I'm not trying to reduce all that—but what I mean is that here we're not dealing with the tool, we're dealing
45:09 with the instrument—ah, you're splitting hairs! Well yes, there is an enormous difference that was studied by a great Vietnamese Marxist, I'm thinking here of Trần Đức Thảo, and Saint Hazard, isn't it, who reflected a great deal on the phenomenological current and who had clearly shown the difference between the tool and the instrument: the tool—and this is what's recognized by those who work on cave engravings in the Sahara, on arrowheads, flint points—has a typical form. The monkey will pick up the stone that's there, that it finds; it will not fabricate the tool itself. It can break a branch, yes, there is indeed modification, but there is no imposition of a form that will repeat itself identically, the way arrowheads change in size—some big, some small—but they all have the same form; axes, tomb axes for example, like those of the tumulus civilization which stretches from the eastern Mediterranean to Great Britain by way of the Atlantic coast, where you find everywhere
46:19 these tumuli with the warrior buried with his weapons and with his axes, which all have the same form—that's what I come back to, form, the eidos in Greek, which gives rise to the idea and which brings us to the very foundation of Marxism. I'll go quickly because I don't want to lose sight of the essential by wasting time on details, and I don't want the forest of praxis to be hidden here by the trees of the various here-and-nows.
46:51 I'm recalling that Marx, in a crucial passage, says that what immediately distinguishes the clumsiest architect from the most expert bee is that the architect has the representation of his house in his mind before producing it in reality, before inscribing it in matter. And it's this representation which is precisely what we call a thought—we often forget that. That is to say, there is a projection; it's not an instinct unfolding like a program, the way a machine runs a computer program.
The threshold of the human: representation, sign and signal 47:30 You see that reflections on artificial intelligence would do well to go back to this passage from Marx. Now, precisely, this presupposes that there is a representation. I'm dwelling on this a bit because we discussed it for ages with Clouscard—often on the eternal problem of poorly posed questions. Marx says clearly that mystification lies less in the answers than in the way of posing the questions and the problems.
48:01 Where should we place the cursor to define the threshold at which we pass from zoology to anthropology, from animal to man? I laugh because, I mean, we always come back to this problem of the threshold, sometimes between animal and man, sometimes between inert matter and living matter—it's the same debates. Are viruses living beings? We find the same debates of uncertainty, of an intermediate stage where we never know whether we're before this crossing or already after it.
48:37 And here, to come back to where the cursor should be placed between animal and man, as if there were a moment, a December 31st at midnight, as I often say, before which we're in zoology and after which, starting January 1st at 1 a.m., we've become human. We neglect the temporal dimension on which Lenin insists so much in his work on the concept of reflection.
49:11 And so, what am I saying? Some say that this threshold is language, for example. Man, language—the animal has forms of communication. Language is human. I'm not against that. What I'm against is saying that the threshold is there. But it's true that there is a specificity to human language compared to all forms of animal communication. In particular, the use of metaphor, precisely, and of what the Prague Circle, the linguists of the Prague Circle, call the poetic function present in all human languages.
49:47 And so I gave an example earlier with "the day is breaking." Others say, no, it's not language, it's the tool. And there again we've seen that between the tool and the instrument, things are shaky. Ah, but no, it's religious thought. Ah, but laughter—there are even some, Rabelais, laughter, the distinguishing feature of man, why not? Ah yes, we could argue about what really constitutes the threshold. But not all of these are to be placed on the same level. What I mean is that language itself presupposes praxis.
50:20 That's why I privilege it. And why do I say that? I don't want to say it gratuitously, because here we're at the heart of what should have been the philosophical reflection preliminary to the historical sciences. There is a common point between the tool, praxis, and language. It is precisely in this concept of representation: making be there something that is not there.
50:52 I often use the example of the tomb to make this understood, with its... the Greek term that designates it, Sōma. Sōma, the tomb. Sēma, the sign. It's a play on words that Plato already makes 2,500 years ago in the Gorgias, for example. Sōma, sēma—the body, sōma, a tomb, pardon—yes, the body, sōma, a tomb, the sign sēma. Semaphore, semantics, we find this again, semiology, etc.
51:24 For what is a tomb, if not something that is there so that we think of someone who is no longer there? To give a presence to what is absolutely absent. So, I was saying, you see, that this kind of reality is eminently and properly human, appearing only with man. You'd agree that when researchers do fieldwork in the Omo Valley in Africa, to determine whether they're dealing with a monkey, an australopithecine, or a man, if they find remains of a burial, we no longer even ask the question—that settles it, we're dealing with man. We agree that when I speak of a tomb, we're squarely within anthropology.
52:00 That's why I favor this example. Now, this example shows that the emergence of man is immediately dialectical, that is, there is a contradiction. How can one make be there what is not there? The animal, for its part, is always within being-there, within the Dasein as it's called in German thought, which literally means being-there. What exists for the animal is only what is there, which may manifest itself in the form of a smell, a noise, a sound, a sight, a light.
52:30 Of a sign. In short, the animal does not have access to the sign. It has access, and this is already enormous, to the signal. Thus, all the animals of the savannah bolt when they smell, or eventually, when they see and smell at the same time the smoke of the great bush fires that occur at the end of the dry season in the African savannah, for example. Because smoke signals fire—it's not a sign. Because the relationship between smoke and fire is sufficiently explained by physical causality alone.
53:00 Smoke is always a consequence of fire. There is a consecution of cause and effect within the same natural being-there. It's the same senses, isn't it, that sniff out the smoke and that dread the fire—there's no need to think for that, far from it. The proof is that even insects—we can't say they're champions of brain development, insects—you have to see it, I've often seen it in Africa: as soon as you approach a bush fire, you see thousands of insects on the edge of the road fleeing.
53:42 There, there is a link that is not arbitrary between smoke and fire. It's not man who decided that smoke signals fire. There is a natural, physical, chemical in-itself, which we observe, and which belongs to the order of the hard sciences. Whereas taking the word "lion" to designate the animal that this word expresses—which isn't the case only in French—is a convention. There is no natural link between the sound-utterance "lion" and the animal designated by this word.
54:18 The proof is that in German it's Löwe and in Bambara it's diarra—that's for the Malians, for example. There's no longer any connection to be seen. There, we have brutally passed, if I may say so, from the thesis and antithesis of nature to convention—from the link between the signal and what it signals, smoke and fire, which presupposes a natural link, to a link that I'll call outright supernatural.
54:48 I could say non-natural, because some are wary of the religious connotations. That's not what I meant to say, but I'm showing that it doesn't exclude that. Religion isn't as foolish as all that. As one might say, theology is a serious matter. So, anthropologically speaking, smoke signals fire—the link is natural. The word diarra in Bambara designates the lion—a conventional link, the link of language. That's what Saussure, one of the first true founders of scientific, structural linguistics, saw very clearly.
55:21 It's that the arbitrariness of the sign, as opposed to the naturalness of the signal. I wanted to dig into all these developments to recall that the notion of sign, which concentrates what is anthropological in human reality—there's not only that in man. When I'm hungry, I'm no longer within convention. There, it's nature acting within me, not the nature of the little birds outside, the scenery, the landscape.
55:53 That's precisely the failing of environmentalism, to confuse nature with what is external to us and which we would supposedly be in the process of destroying. No, it's within us too, nature is. It's within us. It's a natural law that makes my teeth hurt when I've forgotten to clean out the sugar stuck between them. And simply, when I'm hungry every day, that's a manifestation of an implacably natural law. Nature is not the place of freedom, it is the place of determination, on the contrary, the place of constraint par excellence.
56:25 I say that because there are some healthy reminders to be made in these times. So here I take nature as the object of physics, the only scientific way to speak of it, and not nature in the polemical sense I respect, as was the case in the 18th century when people spoke of the natural rights of man, meaning those that man has independently of the constraints imposed on him by society. There it's a polemical sense of nature, such that one could say it's natural for me to go to the cinema on a Saturday evening. There's nothing natural in the cinema or in Saturday or in any of that.
56:56 But there it means I'm free after all to go to the cinema on a Saturday evening. That I respect. But the physical, scientific sense of nature, if we take it seriously, shouldn't be content with what we see from the outside, with the greenery, especially since greenery is really extremely rare in the universe. It may even be unique. I don't know statistically, but in any case it's not the rule. It's rather the exception. But it manifests itself within us. Nature is when I'm hungry.
57:26 If we associated that with the term nature, we would probably have an environmentalism less fantasized than the one we see wreaking havoc around us. I'm speaking about environmentalism. Otherwise, I'm a fervent militant for the struggle to preserve a healthy environment. I'm dwelling on these questions of Clouscardian semantics.
Authors as major signifiers; a constructed concept 58:00 There are few texts by Clouscard that group together all these problems in the order in which they're classified here, the order of gravity in which he deploys them in his response to Claude Morilhat. So, precisely, he takes an example. He quotes Morilhat. Zécien's [Hegel's?] broad-strokes sketch, implied under Clouscard's pen, the broad-strokes sketch is barely distinguishable from caricature.
58:35 That's a criticism he makes of Clouscard. For lack of the necessary cultural distance. And Clouscard replies: but Claude Morilhat has also understood very well that these great authors only serve me, I quote, as a major signifier. You see I wasn't far from the Clouscardian text. As the major signifier of the phenomenology of the bourgeoisie. Every word counts. I am indifferent to their work.
59:07 You know many authors who say that. It means: I don't care about the details of the work. I'm not doing the history of philosophy, the history of thought. And there, I go from Sartre to Althusser, by developing the respective themes proper to each. No, let's leave that aside. There are academies for that, let's leave it. Those are disciplines I respect, but that's the history of philosophy. We're not at all on the paths of praxis. We're not at all in the subtlety we'll see later.
59:40 Clouscard sums up, in order to oppose it to neo-Kantianism, which is the generic envelope of all the currents of thought he criticizes, the counter-revolutionary currents of thought. He isn't talking about Kantianism. But to this neo-Kantianism he opposes his own viewpoint: the philosophies stemming from the French Revolution, essentially characterized by the Rousseau-Kant axis precisely. A Kant not to be confused with the neo-Kantians.
1:00:10 So I take up his sentence again. I am indifferent to their works as such. They only served me to designate — signify, designate, look closely at the vocabulary, the word sign and its root appear twice — the articulations, the themes, the figures, the "beings," in quotation marks. Terms common to thoughts as different, even opposed, as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, for example, the beings of this phenomenology of theoretical neo-Kantianism.
1:00:42 So he wants to bring out something he's the first to produce. I'm going to dwell on it a little here. This concept of neo-Kantianism. And I dwell on it in a way that's both happy and a bit solemn. Happy, because starting next academic year, those who kindly follow us will be able to get, from Éditions Delga, an important publication written by young Simon Verdun — may he forgive me for putting him in the spotlight like this, ahead of his future readership — Delga will soon publish the edition of the thesis he defended at the École Normale Supérieure last year, which was titled the critique of neo-Kantianism in Michel Clouscard, or rather, the critique of neo-Kantianism and dialectical reason in Michel Clouscard.
1:01:53 So one might say, well, why are you announcing this so solemnly — neo-Kantianism, a familiar problem, a notion familiar to those who've studied philosophy, and so on — I insist, in Michel Clouscard. And here I come back to the response to Morilhat, because that's where he specifies, with great rigor, in what way what he calls neo-Kantianism is something specific that has little to do with, is an original construction, an extremely rigorous elaboration, in short a concept and not a representation found lying around — because, let's say I ask a philosophy student at random, he immediately thinks of the neo-Kantian schools, he immediately thinks of a representation, he thinks of Adorno, he thinks of the Frankfurt School, he thinks of Horkheimer, he thinks, if he knows the history of philosophy a bit better, of Cohen, who is one of the first to bring Kantianism back into fashion in the first half of the 19th century — those neo-Kantianisms are well classified, familiar,
1:03:03 it's not at all about that in Clouscard, it's not about this thought which, as if by chance, at the very moment Marxism is being elaborated and published, at the moment Marx is putting at the disposal of those who are neither in philosophy nor in the human sciences, but in the strike, in the struggle, in exploitation, when he's putting at their service a theoretical detour not yet called dialectical materialism and historical materialism, but tools of thought that these workers will soon seize upon — it's as if by chance at that very moment that there emerge, is it chance?
1:03:57 I come back to the word — what are now called the human and/or social sciences. The difference seems trivial since it designates the same disciplines. Sociology, anthropology, linguistics, we agree. Do they appear when Marxism emerges? And Clouscard often said — it was a quip to be taken extremely seriously given how regularly he brought it back up, and it often ended in a chuckle, a gleeful little laugh.
1:04:30 The human sciences were invented to lock down nascent Marxism. The state of anarchy in which the edifice of the so-called social, human sciences etc. currently finds itself. The comparison is damning with the so-called hard sciences, contrasting with the profound unity that Marxism would have been able to bring them if they had been called, as I said earlier and as I maintain, the historical sciences, recalling that they have a historical crucible — and I come back to our young friend Simon Verdun, who in his approach to neo-Kantianism in Michel Clouscard shows very well that Clouscard insisted, throughout practically his entire published and even oral work — I can testify to this through our discussions and exchanges, live or by phone, as I was often far away south of the Sahara — on this generic concept of neo-Kantianism
Neo-Kantians without knowing it: Sartre and the structuralists 1:05:40 in Michel Clouscard, that is to say it is present in thinkers who have absolutely no idea that they are neo-Kantian. Sartre doesn't think of Kant when he says psychoanalysis is a bit too easy — I'm not discussing what he says about psychoanalysis, it may be true, it may be false, that's another matter, it's very coherent in any case — when Sartre says that, the unconscious is too convenient a cover, at the moral level it's a bit too handy, I can say, excuse me, I did that, it's not my fault, it's my unconscious, it exempts me from being responsible for my acts — that's very neo-Kantian, it's very Kantian, this way of affirming freedom at the base of my acts, for example, but Sartre isn't aware at that moment of being Kantian. Now Sartre here — you see, I'm doing like Clouscard, I'm not discussing here the internal articulation of his thought, I'm discussing the positioning of these proper names — Sartre in relation now to what is supposed to oppose him as a proper name, the thinkers of the so-called structuralist current: when we look at the emergence of structuralism, that's my generation, during the 60's as they used to say, as they still say,
1:06:50 Lévi-Strauss, the founding fathers, the Foucaults, the Lacans and all those who don't necessarily recognize themselves under that label, because one doesn't like being a category, one likes being an individual, fair enough — but here I insist precisely on what they have in common. Now when you look closely at what they have in common, it's that they all committed the parricide of Sartre. Sartre was the king of the oil field in the Parisian French intellectual world in the immediate postwar period with existentialism, and to oppose him — well, to oppose in order to make a field, you have to clear a forest that was there beforehand, or drain a marsh, in short modify what was already there — so that structuralism could make itself a place, existentialism had to be liquidated, and the father there was Sartre, the parricide had to be committed. I often suggest to philosophy students that they should one day write a thesis on the notion of parricide in philosophy. Socrates — we don't know much since he left no written traces — but we know that Socrates started out as a Parmenidean before repudiating him. Plato started out as
1:08:02 Pythagorean, Aristotle begins with the parricide of Plato, Plato commits the parricide of Parmenides, Aristotle commits the parricide of Plato, Descartes commits the parricide of Aristotle — the principle of inertia that Descartes formulates, which sums up all the advances of Galilean physics, is a collapse of Aristotelian finalism, of teleological physics. Spinoza committed the parricide of Descartes. Kant liquidates all the thought he calls dogmatic — Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz alike — and which some still dream of today, and who would do well if they could simply go back to Kant, that would already be progress compared to the present, those who still flounder in what's called logical neo-positivism or the analytic school, who believe that with a formulation of algorithms taken from the example of mathematics, one will be able to make a rigorous philosophy. Kant ruined that hope in his critique of philosophical dogmatism,
Kant against dogmatism; Deleuze and Althusser against dialectic 1:09:12 dogmatism which gave Descartes the illusion that his method could apply to everything — those long chains of very simple and easy reasons that geometers use to arrive at their most difficult proofs — led him to imagine that all things that can fall within human knowledge, there's the dogmatism, all follow one another in the same way — in the same way as what? As cause and physical effect, or as the primitive proposition in mathematics and the derived proposition, the theorem I prove by showing that it doesn't contradict a prior proposition already recognized as true — that all follow one another in the same way, thus subjecting the so-called social or human sciences today to the same implacable, determining logic that excludes freedom, the same as the sciences of nature, for example. Kant did ruin that hope, showing that there is always something that escapes, not through any powerlessness of the mind — on the contrary, because the mind has something else to do besides know. I'm thinking of Novalis
1:10:22 the German Romantics — it's rare, generally I cite them as through the severe critique Hegel made of them — but a fellow like Novalis has the merit of telling you: we will surely never know one another, but we will do much better than know one another — yes, there's more than knowledge, in one of his aphorisms. So I'll close that parenthesis, but it's important to remember that our so-called philosophical intellectual world today has become so impoverished that it only understands two great wings: either an irrationalism stemming from Heidegger, the philosophy of being, of ontology, or the pseudo-mathematical formalism of the analytic school — and the point is to dismiss both back to back, and that's exactly what the unity of the sciences of history proposed — many rooms in the house of history that all have in common the fact of being dialectical
1:11:32 this dialectic which Deleuze didn't wave away with the back of his hand by saying "the infamous dialectic" — this dialectic, Deleuze never called himself a Marxist, why not — except that what's much more unexpected is that someone like Althusser — I'm taking up here the people Clouscard criticizes, and about whom Morilhat says Clouscard is too hasty — no, we clearly see Clouscard's rigor: the common point between two thinkers who apparently have nothing to do with each other, Deleuze's and Althusser's, is that both share a way of setting dialectics aside. Now Althusser has passed, and still passes for many people who know little of Marx's work, for the Marxist par excellence. Now, one doesn't need to interpret or force Marx's texts to see how fundamental the dialectical method is for him — well, he may be right, he may be wrong, Marx is another debate — but one cannot decouple Marx from the notion of dialectics, as Deleuze does, that's his problem
1:12:42 but as Althusser does too, which is already much more unexpected when you consider that he reigned — as I said earlier — even over what claimed to be Marxist within the Communist Party, which is even more serious — that's where we measure Clouscard's solitude in having maintained the dialectical tradition. So I take up here his reply when he says there is a theoretical neo-Kantianism — it must be understood, and I insist a great deal, and if one wants more detail I refer to this book that will be ready starting next academic year, Critique of Neo-Kantianism and Dialectical Reason in Michel Clouscard, by Simon Verdun — for the details of what neo-Kantianism is, I'd like to insist on the essential point: it's a generic term, I repeat, present even in authors who themselves don't declare themselves neo-Kantian. One will say, yes, but that's too easy, you're putting words in people's mouths behind their backs, you can't do that.
Lévi-Strauss: a Kantianism without a transcendental subject 1:13:52 That's a bit what Morilhat says to Clouscard: you can't — here it's not very rigorous — go beyond phenomenology, since you invoke their text to bring in notions absent from their statements. Ah, but wait, sometimes it's in the statement itself. I'm thinking of Lévi-Strauss, who is rightly considered the founding father of what's called structuralism, whether those concerned recognize themselves in it or not, that's another matter — in any case, in one of his first fundamental publications, called Structural Anthropology no less, and in the doctoral thesis that was his first great publication, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, an admirable work — I'm not trying to reduce their depth and rigor — but what does Lévi-Strauss say to define his own thought in a transversal way, not in the preface — he calls it "Overture," so much is this book marked by music, since starting with this book — I'm thinking of The Raw and the Cooked, a very famous title, but it's the first installment of a series he calls Mythologiques, in the plural, all revolving around
1:15:04 the table in the nutritional, mythological sense, then afterward From Honey to Ashes, then The Origin of Table Manners — you see, there's a whole series of works that revolve apparently around the seemingly quite familiar act of eating, which is not so familiar, which is fundamental, since where the animal eats raw, man eats cooked. Cooked, yes, cooked with fire, or even without fire — you know what Tahitian-style fish is, foods that are cooked chemically without flames, marinated all night in vinegar, in wild boar — a wild boar marinade, as we say back home in Corsica — in herbs, in lemon, as is done for Tahitian-style fish — in short, fundamental, the cooked and the raw. The raw is natural, the cooked is cultural, historical — that's his cultural delirium — and let's go back from the church to Clouscard, I quote Clouscard to say that — not preface, because it's starting with this work that he says it's no longer linguistics alone that's the reference discipline serving as his lighthouse
1:16:14 but music — interesting, that's not my subject, but it'll be worth coming back to another time because it's an inexhaustible vein — and that's why, to show the musical connotations of this work, the chapters are called "Cantata of the Opossum," "Fugue of the Five Senses," etc. The overture isn't called, or the preface isn't called preface or introduction but straight up "Overture," as for an opera. It's in the overture to The Raw and the Cooked that he says this: he quotes Ricoeur, who had said of him, of Lévi-Strauss, that Lévi-Strauss's structuralism is, I quote Ricoeur, Paul Ricoeur, "a Kantianism without a transcendental subject," and Lévi-Strauss says: I confess, I mean, I fully subscribe to this definition, yes, that's exactly right, my system does indeed amount to a Kantianism without a subject. So it's absurd to say that Clouscard is putting people on trial in absentia or speaking behind their backs — and Lévi-Strauss
1:17:25 even adds that the absence of a transcendental subject is, for him, an advantage over Kant — if we were to look for a difference — and not a drawback, and so on. So there you have it, Kantianism without a transcendental subject, stated clearly. Do you want me to quote Foucault, a flagship of that current? Foucault said: we are all neo-Kantian. So it's astonishing that Clouscard, in an immense ontological and political solitude, was the only one to say: what circulates through currents of thought that seem to oppose and quarrel with one another on TV panels, in interviews, or in books, between the existentialists, the structuralists, the new philosophers — what circulates? Neo-Kantianism. Ah, but it's not at all the historical neo-Kantianism of the Frankfurt School, and it's not a return to Kant, watch out — so, third point, I insist, neo-Kantianism is for one part
Kant falsified during his own lifetime 1:18:35 Kantianism, and I'll show it's for a small part — and Clouscard thinks so too — in any case for the least interesting part of Kant in all this, we'll get there, that is, the part that is not the philosophy of the French Revolution, unlike the best of Kant, that Kant who says Rousseau is the Newton of morality, that Kant who places freedom at the center as the keystone of the whole philosophical apparatus, as the meeting point of the great arches of the philosophy of knowledge and of action, of theoretical philosophy — the critique of pure reason — and of practical philosophy — the critique of practical reason or the metaphysics of morals, the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals — each time all this meets on the enigma of freedom, which was relegated to the thing in itself. Even so, we're forced to return to the strictly philosophical, since we're obliged to return to it with this circulating neo-Kantianism — historical reminder, in Kant's own lifetime
1:19:45 I meant to say when his ashes were still warm, but no, he wasn't even dead yet, he was still alive — old, but there they were, the young men, the three of them, Hölderlin, Schelling, Hegel, fellow students at the Protestant seminary — these young men were destined, they had to earn a living, to become pastors on their mothers' advice, they worried about their future — there weren't at the time masses of philosophy professorships in the universities, the teaching of philosophy in university chairs was still in its infancy — you had to attend Fichte's lectures in Jena, for example. The three of them, while Kant was still alive, are indignant in their correspondence, they exchange letters — Kant is their god, you should see how they talk about him: Kant is the Moses of our nation, says Schelling, the Moses who guides us toward the promised land — extraordinary phrases like that. And already there is a falsification of Kant that they denounce, the three young men, when they say the priests are stealing Kant from us — I'm putting it bluntly,
1:20:55 as Clouscard would say, in my own words — the priests are recuperating Kant, taking advantage of the fact that Kant placed a ban on knowledge of the thing in itself — I won't dwell on things familiar to anyone who's studied a bit of philosophy, that we must think but cannot know, to use the Kantian formula, and that because we cannot know it, we have a duty to think this thing in itself — so that the religious, who were threatened by the whole movement of the Enlightenment of which Kant is the supreme flowering, the clerical world says: you see, philosophy itself says that all our reasoning, our human reason, is feeble, that without God's grace we cannot reach the essential — there, that's how Kant gets falsified, used to restore religion — and to quote Kant's phrase, "I have found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" — yes, I was telling you, in fact we're back at the temple, since we're in the Protestant world
The Rousseau-Kant axis 1:22:05 at the church, at the mosque, whatever you like — and there you have it, this thinker who was thoroughly German, Protestant, puritanical, disciplined I'd say — I'm not mocking him, great things were achieved thanks to this discipline, I'm thinking of Bach's music, and things that are anything but puritanical dryness — but who worked in the library every day, with handkerchiefs hung on strings from the ceiling so as not to waste time searching in his sleeves — time is money, Protestantism and capitalism — who had an extremely regulated life, and took his little walk starting at 6pm, when day or night was falling, for a certain distance, then came back — as is well known, this is anecdotal — only twice did he depart from his sacrosanct habits, and those two times: the first was to be among the first to have a copy of Rousseau's Social Contract, which had just been published — far from religion,
1:23:15 we're at the opposite pole, we're at what would become the most avant-garde thing for the French Revolution, which terrified even Voltaire and the other Enlightenment figures, so avant-garde was it, since it questioned property itself — imagine that, what sacrilege — and the second time, following the storming of the Bastille, to be the first to get the newspapers and the news. So what Clouscard is going to call — by building a concept he's really the only one — I'd like there to be team efforts — the philosophy of the French Revolution, the Rousseau-Kant axis that will extend into Hegel etc., yes, when I say philosophy of the French Revolution, whose essential axis proceeds from what he calls — sorry, whose first moment proceeds from what he calls the Rousseau-Kant axis — and that's where we see that Kant must not be confused with neo-Kantianism, which is counter-revolutionary. He replies this to Morilhat:
1:24:27 "This criticism surprises me a great deal, after what I was able to say in On Modernity: Rousseau or Sartre" — I recall that at that time this work, On Modernity: Rousseau or Sartre, had not yet been retitled, as it now has been by Éditions Delga, Critique of Libertarian Liberalism, with Clouscard's agreement of course, but that's because the title On Modernity: Rousseau or Sartre seemed a bit enigmatic to quite a few readers. So I take up again: "This criticism surprises me greatly, after what I was able to say in On Modernity: Rousseau or Sartre about the logic and phenomenology of praxis and about neo-Kantianism" — you see, we're right in it — "Claude Morilhat cannot possibly ignore" — because Morilhat had unfortunately accused Clouscard of empiricism, a fundamental misreading — "cannot ignore that between the empiricism of the Enlightenment," which I denounce, "and the neo-Kantian philosophy" — I specify, not Kantian but neo-Kantian, I'll come back to this right away — "of liberalism"
1:25:37 "there was Hegel and Marx" — so within the philosophy of the French Revolution that extends the Rousseau-Kant axis, there is precisely Hegel and Marx, who cannot be reduced to Rousseau and Kant, agreed. When we see the importance of the industrial revolution in Marx's work, it's not present in Rousseau — Rousseau's political dream would have been to divide France into small, equal landed proprietors, one could say Rousseau misses the industrial revolution entirely — slightly nuanced when we look at his draft constitution for Corsica, which he couldn't finish, since the brutal French repression and the collapse of the last throes of magnificent Corsican resistance at Ponte-Novu meant that no constitution could be made for a country that had lost its independence, that was no longer anything but a province, a mere region — and in that draft Rousseau inquires about the island's mineral and industrial resources, I mean, well, it was so embryonic
The post-Kantians, Hölderlin and Thomas Mann 1:26:47 there's not much to talk about. And as for Kant, there's a kind of ban on knowledge such that there's intelligibility only for the sciences of nature — you see how we arrive at today — ah, there we can say, there we're being serious, scientific, neo-positivism as we'd say today, that's true — whereas in the human sciences we can think but not know, because the world — I'm speaking as Kant here — the self, the soul, these are Ideas, says Kant, not concepts, I'll go quickly, it's in all the philosophy textbooks, no need for words to spell it out, but I refer to it for those unfamiliar — concepts are constitutive of science, the concept of space and time, one cannot constitute physics without the concepts of space and time, mathematically — but Ideas are not constitutive, they are regulative — a rule is weaker than a law — there is a law of the fall of bodies, there are rules in morality, there is no law, it's weaker — for lack of being able to know
1:28:00 the thing in itself — so I'm saying there are shortcomings in Rousseau and Kant, and it's these shortcomings that the immediate post-Kantians — the three friends, I come back to them, Hölderlin, Schelling, Hegel, I insist on the fact that there are three of them, for the pleasure of reciting again this apparently enigmatic but here very clear line by Hölderlin, an isolated fragment in a poem, itself a fragment of a poem, "Cloverleaf that so splendidly grows green" — the clover is three-lobed, as they say — it's not botany — what do these three young men do, they try to fill what remained empty in Kant. I'm not discussing whether their project succeeded or failed, but Fichte is the first to plunge into this path, then Schelling, then Hölderlin and Hegel, and we know all that Marx owes to what came out of it
1:29:13 in Hegel — let's leave the others aside, Lukács's critique is there to show how much Schelling later deviated into what Lukács called the destruction of reason, and Hölderlin was unfortunately snatched from us by madness. Small brief parenthesis to say that these days — that is, quite recently, very recently indeed — there's a growing upward reassessment of the influence Hölderlin may have had on Hegel — when we see the influence of Hegel on Marx, that's something never mentioned. And I'll close, I said this parenthesis would be short, but to encourage looking further into and researching the admirable formula of a German — one of the rare Germans who saved the honor of German intelligentsia during the most terrible periods, I'm thinking here of course of Thomas Mann, who had to go into exile, take refuge in the United States, and who upon his return, on the ruins and rubble of the Reich, uttered this crucial formula, that the problems
1:30:23 of Germany — my God, this is topical — and therefore of Europe, since we see today that Europe is Germany — the problems of Germany will not be resolved until Marx and Hölderlin are reconciled. Thomas Mann — it had to come from a novelist, a man of letters, and not from someone who teaches at the EHESS. That's exactly what Clouscard here protests against: "Claude Morilhat cannot possibly ignore that between the empiricism of the Enlightenment," which I denounce, "and the neo-Kantian philosophy of liberalism" — so he's not saying between the Enlightenment and Kant, Kant is the crowning of the Enlightenment — but between the Enlightenment and what is recent, what is our era, the counter-revolution that has raged against Marxism, called structuralism, then new philosophy, up to today — passing, I should say, through the most Nazi
Historical neo-Kantianism and the concept of totalitarianism 1:31:33 of philosophers, the one whose student invented the concept of totalitarianism to forever tarnish Marxism — it's not about having a symmetry with communism, it's having a symmetry with Nazism, and the deal is sealed — that comes to us from one of the closest students of the most Nazi of philosophers — I'll leave it there for now, at the risk of scandalizing, since that's not the subject, but this notion of totalitarianism is very easy to refute, I've already done it in my seminars, I won't waste time on it — I'll stick to this concept of neo-Kantianism, it's not something found lying around — he says, he repeats it constantly, this formula, neo-Kantianism, in this reply to Morilhat is not a formula found lying around, it's not the neo-Kantianism taught in university chairs, which also has its importance, the neo-Kantianism of Cohen, then of Max Scheler, moral neo-Kantianism, of Horkheimer, who are
1:32:43 all so many ways of reacting against the pressure of materialism in the 19th century — materialism at work in the so-called hard sciences, essentially, if not almost exclusively, the sciences of nature — this scientism, never to be confused with science, or at best this positivism of Auguste Comte, to which we return today, cognitive science is neo-positivism, it's again a confusion, the confusion of the anthropological sphere and the natural sphere — a huge confusion of nature and matter — that all this is material, we agree, but not all matter is natural, otherwise I don't see how we would distinguish natural flowers from artificial flowers — both are material, we agree, but there's still a bouquet of the two that has nothing natural about it. We're talking about flowers, we could talk about breasts thanks to silicone — for us to be able to say this is natural, that presupposes
1:33:53 that we've come out of nature and that we have the possibility of producing things that aren't natural, so that we need to say, ah no, I guarantee you these flowers are natural, or that this cheese was made by purely natural methods — that means we know full well that some labels say "pure goat," you know you're allowed to put "pure goat" even if there's 70% cow's milk, you know that — but you're not allowed to put "100% pure goat," a small nuance to know about labels. There you go, yes. So, back to it: historical neo-Kantianism is one thing, Horkheimer, Adorno, the Frankfurt School, how to be on the left without being a communist — that's something I'm adding, I'm starting to build alongside Musca [Morilhat?] the great problem of Sartre, how to be able to remain on the left without being a communist — that, for Sartre, is neo-Kantianism found in the academic
1:35:03 historical academic tradition of Sartre, producing not a notion but a concept, one that has to be worked through to be understood — again, this is what comes to oppose here the advances of what he calls the philosophies of the French Revolution, or in generic terms, in the singular, the revolution of philosophy — no, the philosophy, excuse me, in the singular, of the French Revolution — so you see a great diptych: the philosophy of the French Revolution, Rousseau, then Hegel, Marx in their progression, Lenin, I mean it's not finished, I mean it's not finished, up to — and facing it, opposing, resisting, and trying to restore the essence of the Ancien Régime, facing this philosophy of the French Revolution, neo-Kantianism — that's where we see it's a construction, I remind you, and that's why I insist — if I now set aside the strictly philosophical problems for a brief moment to return to problems
Between revolution and counter-revolution: confusionism and the extreme center 1:36:13 purely historical — that we are not currently in a space opened up by the revolution, nor by the counter-revolution, we are in the conflict between revolution and counter-revolution — that's why it's hard to see clearly, and that's why I don't like people confusing mediation, a fundamental Hegelian concept that dismisses the extremes back to back, the middle term, with the center — which I did a moment ago, a bit disdainfully, because I have a political mistrust of the extreme center — let me be precise: take a segment AB, put a point M in the middle, make AM red — and I assume these are fresh colors and all — and MB blue, point M — everyone can guess it will be purple. That's what I hold against the extreme center: you never know where you stand, you can just as easily tip one way as the other. You're anti-Gaullist? Oh, me too, how convenient.
1:37:23 Well yes, I'm anti-Gaullist because he handed Algeria over to the Arabs — wait, I thought he was Gaullist because he resisted fascism, you see how the same thing, the same position can be ambivalent, that's what I denounced in the center, in what claims to be moderate, my friend, my late friend Arthur Adamov, the third great name of that great triptych of the theater of the absurd, of Ionesco, Beckett, Adamov — Adamov wrote a play that I recommend all the more since now people deliberately lock it away to punish him for the very bad taste of having joined the Communist Party when everyone was fleeing it after the intervention in Hungary. Anyway, Adamov wrote a play whose title is fairly explicit in relation to what I was in the middle of saying, so I'll stop there: "Mr. the Moderate." The great criminals, "M" the cursed one — but this one is "Mr. the Moderate." That kind of moderation produces millions of deaths. Remember Giscard, the boss of the centrists, from whom Balladur descends, from whom Sarkozy descends.
1:38:34 There I'm dealing with the official lineages, and that gives us the PS, that gives us — what's his name — the one who created Europe, the first president of the... we're right in the middle of it there, that center I'm criticizing. I'll make a short historical parenthesis: precisely what he holds against neo-Kantianism, what Kantianism itself did not do — Kant is a permanent effort at clarification — whereas those others are in what Clouscard here calls confusionism. Not confusion, that's human, confusion — if I were doing theology I'd say there is sin in our thinking, there is a flaw, there is a lack, we do not have a divine mind, whatever certain naive Spinozists may say — Spinoza was not naive, but there is a neo-Spinozism, that of Deleuze, I'm not even talking about Onfray, from the Cold War, which could almost make us believe that there is in us the divine intellect. So there we are, so all these ways of thinking
1:39:47 which were built up in order to lock away whatever revolution there might be — I'll come back to this — we are not in revolution, we are not in counter-revolution, but we are permanently, before we even begin to think, to reflect, to exercise our critique — we are, in the sense that runs from Kant to Marx, in critique — we are at that point I spoke of, the violet point, where you don't know whether you're in revolution or counter-revolution; the concepts can be taken in both directions. And if capital still exists despite all the upheavals, despite its abject compromises — I'm thinking of French capital in collaboration, in Nazism, throughout Europe — remember Chamberlain coming back from the Munich accords. Chamberlain, after all, was the Prime Minister of England, England, the homeland of democracy, the first parliamentary regimes where the prince has his hands free to do good and his hands tied to do evil. He comes back from Munich, and what does he say?
1:40:57 "Mr. Hitler is a gentleman." The ambiguity of those democracies which discredited themselves — what's left, as I said earlier, is that every political institution sold out to Pétain, voting full powers to Pétain, apart from the Communist Party. At the time, we understand why it was urgent that a student of Heidegger — I'm thinking of course of Hannah Arendt — should urgently construct, after the war, isn't that right?
1:41:29 for the greatest benefit of the CIA at the start of the Cold War, this concept of totalitarianism, which not only allowed people to forget that the whole of bourgeois Europe used to say before the war "better Hitler than the Popular Front," he's not so bad, this Mr. Hitler, who put down the unions — there were no crimes yet, there was no Auschwitz, we didn't know, so people were careless, they said out loud that Hitler wasn't so bad, reread the press of the time, I'm inventing nothing. And then after the war we're told: communism, Nazism, it's the same thing — the same people who used to say "better Hitler than the Popular Front," and even the same as those who said "Mr. Hitler is a gentleman," the same as those — I forget his name because I've got Pilsudski stuck in my head, I'm thinking of Poland of course, but a deputy of Colonel Beck who was running Poland just before the war, at a moment a few weeks before the outbreak of the war, which begins with Germany's attack on Poland, when the number two of the Polish government, whose name escapes me but it's easy to find, said to Ribbentrop
1:42:40 to Hitler's foreign affairs officials: yes, well, we have differences over Danzig etc., but after all we're talking between civilized people, it's not like with the Soviets. You see, all that has to be made to be forgotten. Now we're told, yes it's true the Poles are very anti-Russian, but you have to understand them, they went through a martyrdom — sorry, hundreds of thousands of Soviets fell to liberate Poland, at Auschwitz. I visited the cemetery in Weimar, in Germany — not far, 200 km east of the Polish border — there are thousands of poor 18-year-old kids who fell just to liberate Weimar, where the Buchenwald camp was, 3 km away. And there it is, and once again I know it annoys my friends at the PRCF when I say this, but I would probably have been shot under Stalin given the way I speak. I'm not defending
1:43:51 but still, I will never forget that the commander-in-chief — and he was the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Union — and of an army thanks to which we are no longer under the Nazi boot, because if we had waited for the others, the Western landing happens in '44, when the Soviets are at the gates of Berlin, they're not far off, they already have Berlin in hand, and where Germany is kaputt, to use a German term. So all this, to understand that the notion of neo-Kantianism in Clouscard is the philosophical construction that comes to support these historical forces I've just mentioned. But careful, we're addressing civilized people, we're not going to tell them we're far-right — no, we're not going to say we're on the right, we're reactionary, we're pro-capitalist, no, on the contrary we're going to say we're Kantian, we must go back to Kant, that is, go back short of that advance which is the dialectic. And here I quote again
Returning to Kant without dialectic; announcement of a sequel 1:45:21 he saw everything so clearly that he immediately drew the curtain — there you have everything that is positive and negative in Kant summed up as only Clouscard knows how to do it. He saw so much that he drew the curtain right away: I'm not going to look at that, the thing-in-itself is unknowable after all. But it's not that Kant to go back to, because before drawing the curtain, my goodness, what advances! "Rousseau is the Newton of morality" — that means, we have Newton in the order of nature, we have the sciences, we have physics, that's wonderful, but what advances, with just a line and a half: bodies attract each other in direct proportion to their mass and inverse proportion to the square of their distance. I account — the mind, the brain of that sort of earthworm that is man, manages to account for all the movements of the universe — we'll see later about the exception of those that move at speeds fairly close to the speed of light, as is also the case in cosmography or microphysics — but the equivalent in the moral world, the Newton of morality
1:46:31 in the sense opposed to the natural sciences — I come back to this — the social sciences and the human sciences, there it is Rousseau who is the equivalent of Newton. "Rousseau, the Newton of morality" means that freedom holds, within the order of sciences whose full constitution we're still awaiting, the place occupied by gravity and the law of falling bodies in Newtonian physics — the law of attraction to generalize, falling being a particular case. We're beginning to gauge, through these digressions in the strict sense that I've just made around the fundamental notion of neo-Kantianism in Clouscard, that it is of such richness that we won't regret treating ourselves to the luxury of a second session as an extension of this response by Clouscard to Morilhat, because it has a wealth of material a good part of which I haven't even begun to address yet, for some of it
1:47:41 but I will refrain from doing so until I have a first reaction to your questions about the concepts we've just stirred up and about Clouscard's general orientation in this article. So I'll see you again, if Philippe is available — but I'm convinced he'll do everything he can to be — following this response by Clouscard to Claude Morilhat, which, I repeat, is for me, in a somewhat metonymic way, a means of bringing back up to date everything that is decisive in Michel Clouscard's contribution to contemporary thought, a contribution which, once again, has no equivalent anywhere in the whole Marxist current of the postwar period. And so I bid you farewell, and I hope to see you again very soon, and in the meantime keep having the best holiday, as they say.