Freedom and determinism

What Dominique Pagani says

Dominique Pagani approaches freedom and determinism through Kant's two questions: "what can I know?" and "what ought I to do?". He argues that philosophy presupposes freedom. Will, end, subject and action only make sense if something is not the effect of a prior cause. For Kant, freedom is a postulate of practical reason, which does not prove that it exists: we cannot know it, but we must think it12. In the philosophy of knowledge, the determinism of Spinoza and Newton joins truth and reality and makes possible the foresight that action needs. But it denies the very freedom being sought, which opens a crisis. He criticises Lordon for truncating Spinoza, for whom the sage frees himself by knowing his determinations1. In 2024, he plays "devil's advocate" with a rational theory of Nietzsche's eternal return. He draws a consequence from it: one would then have to accept the return of Auschwitz. Against this return he sets Kafka and Pascal, in whom there is always a subject for another subject3.

1. 1#2.7 Entre crise et guerre : Philosopher ?1 Aug 2017
2. 2#5.9 Kafka Un message impérial29 Jul 2019
3. 3L’éternel retour… des camps de la mort ?13 Oct 2024

Introduction produced automatically from the 3 sessions on this theme, to be reviewed; the numbers link to the sessions.